Um, because you do? Your perceptions could be unreliable, but you still perceive.
And you still didn't tell me what it means to "trust" your sense of reason.
Even if I did, why would this mean that I exist?
I've addressed that roughly 20 times in this thread. But I'll humor you. The fact that the perception happens means that the perception exists. Otherwise, there would be no perception. "I" could simply be the perception of thought. The point is that the subject is the one perceiving, and so must exist, since it's logically impossible to have a perception that isn't yours. Even then, how would you tell the difference? Perception begets awareness, and it will behave in the same way no matter the origin. So, all perceptions that you think are yours are in fact yours, and this necessitates your existence.
Yeah, except that your continued demands for additional proof aren't actually valid.
The truth of your perceptions is completely irrelevant, and for reasons I've already stated, denying that you even have perceptions is a ridiculous exercise. They happen no matter what.
How do I know that I am able to create doubt about my existence?
I've already discussed doubting your existence in this thread. Knock it off. You haven't actually responded to it yet.
I've addressed that roughly 20 times in this thread. But I'll humor you. The fact that the perception happens means that the perception exists. Otherwise, there would be no perception. "I" could simply be the perception of thought. The point is that the subject is the one perceiving, and so must exist, since it's logically impossible to have a perception that isn't yours. Even then, how would you tell the difference? Perception begets awareness, and it will behave in the same way no matter the origin. So, all perceptions that you think are yours are in fact yours, and this necessitates your existence.
Let's say I know that I perceive, and that that which perceives must exist. However, without modus ponens, this does not necessitate my existence. Without modus ponens, I do not know that I exist. On what basis do you put forth modus ponens?
The truth of your perceptions is completely irrelevant, and for reasons I've already stated, denying that you even have perceptions is a ridiculous exercise. They happen no matter what.
Even if it is a "ridiculous exercise", that doesn't make it false. On what basis must I accept that I perceive?
Um, because you do? Your perceptions could be unreliable, but you still perceive.
That's a circular argument - you say that "I perceive because I perceive." "God exists because he exists" is logically valid, but from the information available to me it does not appear to be sound. Why is it sound to say that "I perceive because I perceive"?
To quote Carneades, "Nothing can be known, not even this." (generally better than Socrates' "I know that I know nothing" for obvious reasons).
CI: "A categorical imperative... denotes an absolute, unconditional requirement that asserts its authority in all circumstances, both required and justified as an end in itself."
There is always the possibility of an extenuating circumstance. Murder is wrong, but would you have assassinated Hitler? At what point in the development of the fetus does abortion become murder? Is a self-defense killing murder? Do soldiers commit murder on the battlefield? Does that change if the war can be decided to be "just" or "unjust?" Can war be justified if capital punishment cannot? Do you think Batman should kill the Joker, or let him escape to murder more Boy Scouts at the amusement park? Can we call our failure to intervene in Darfur murder by inaction?
The categorical imperative is great in a vacuum. But it fails to make distinctions that utilitarianism better addresses.
In the absence of any strong argument for it, the fact that it (or at least Kant) concludes that it's wrong to lie to the murderer at the door tells me that the categorical imperative is very likely to be wrong.
Kant's idea of "all circumstances" doesn't really make much sense to me. Which parts of a situation are "circumstances" and which ones are not? For example, if I thrust my hand out in front of me, are not the presence of someone in front of me and the presence of a knife in my hand merely circumstances?
To me, Kant's Categorical Imperative just seems like trumped-up nonsense, as does the rest of deontology.
I hope you're being tongue-in-cheek for a lot of those, Jason, because you're presenting them as if deontologists don't have clear answers for them. Of course killing in war is murder, justified or not. Killing Hitler is a silly example, because killing him would not have ended the Holocaust, if that's what you're implying. The Batman example is also silly because, in real life, there is no such thing as a prisoner that no prison can hold. And "failure to prevent harm" is not a violation of the deontological constraint if the harm that befalls others is not a consequence of our own chosen means or chosen end, even though that is certainly open to criticism on other grounds.
The categorical imperative is great in a vacuum. But it fails to make distinctions that utilitarianism better addresses.
All philosophies exist best in a vacuum. That doesn't make them "unacceptable," as you say. You don't always behave according to consequentialism, because to act that way would be to completely ignore moral right and wrong. You wouldn't always behave according to deontology because to do so would be to ignore practicality. I don't care if you disagree with it, but I take issue with the idea that it's "unacceptable" entirely.
In the absence of any strong argument for it, the fact that it (or at least Kant) concludes that it's wrong to lie to the murderer at the door tells me that the categorical imperative is almost certainly wrong.
You're not presenting it quite correctly. The issue is not that lying to the murderer is wrong. The issue is that, if lying is against one of your personal maxims, to not lie in this situation would conflict with your duty to not cause harm to others outlined by Kant. This is the main criticism of Kantian deontology. Modern deontologists have other principles that prevent this conflict from happening.
Moral right and wrong does not factor into pure consequentialism, only "desirable" and "undesirable" outcomes. There is a difference. As for the second part, I didn't elaborate because I don't remember specifically. Google will help. I'd find stuff, but I'm typing from my phone. Someone who was a true deontologist would be able to argue this better. I'm just playing devil's advocate.
Look, Rob: The old George Washington and the cherry tree style moralism just doesn't hold up to the demands of realism. That's why it's regarded as a tall tale. To hold a moral absolute to be applicable to every circumstance and damn the consequences is untenable. I will lie to my wife's face all day every day about whether her maternity pants make her look fat to get the utilitarian benefit of raising her self-esteem. I fully support the defense lawyer who argues to his fullest on the behalf of a killer, even if the attorney knows the killer is guilty. We all like the idea of Robin Hood stealing from the oppressive monarchy in order to help the poor and defenseless. The problem with the categorical imperative is that it ignores utility.
Of course killing in war is murder, justified or not.
Yes, let's charge World War II veterans with murder. We must uphold our moral code at all costs.
Killing Hitler is a silly example, because killing him would not have ended the Holocaust, if that's what you're implying.
Shut up, John Connor.
The Batman example is also silly because, in real life, there is no such thing as a prisoner that no prison can hold.
Except that recidivism is a huge problem, and prison overcrowding means that an increasing number of hardened felons are being released to make room in the system for new offenders.
And "failure to prevent harm" is not a violation of the deontological constraint
A Massachussets law disagrees with you. The "Good Neighbor" law there requires you to help any person being attacked, etc. It was the basis for the farcical Seinfeld finale.
All philosophies exist best in a vacuum. That doesn't make them "unacceptable," as you say. You don't always behave according to consequentialism, because to act that way would be to completely ignore moral right and wrong. You wouldn't always behave according to deontology because to do so would be to ignore practicality. I don't care if you disagree with it, but I take issue with the idea that it's "unacceptable" entirely.
But the categorical imperative is about always following the moral code, despite the consequences. When you start to apply practicality, interpretation, and reason to the rubric of whether to follow the CI, it becomes utilitarianism, which is good.
Moral right and wrong does not factor into pure consequentialism, only "desirable" and "undesirable" outcomes.
No, this is wrong. Consequentialism alone simply means that the consequences of our actions are the basis we should use to determine which actions to take. It does not make any claims about what kinds of consequences are the ones we ought to aim for, not without additional stipulations.
By introducing "desire" into the equation you have constructed a straw man.
My biggest issue with deontology is that the concept of an "action" is rather poorly defined.
Take the rule "murder is wrong". Why is it "murder" that is the action, and not simply, say, pulling a trigger on a gun? Isn't pulling the trigger the real "action", while someone dying is simply a consequence? Do we then say that pulling a trigger on a gun is wrong, even if the gun isn't pointed at a person? Otherwise, why not consider that absolutely everything that happens as a result of the action to be part of that action?
To accept all consequences as part of the action in deontology is precisely the same as consequentialism. On the other hand, if we don't go that far, then why is murder the action and not trigger-pulling?
Of course killing in war is murder, justified or not.
No, It's actually really not. A murder which can be justified by self-defense or combat is not murder - it's generally justifiable homicide. Do not confuse Murder and Homicide, they are not the same thing.
Yeah, Churba is right; "murder" is a legal term and it should be used correctly. However, that's not really the point of this discussion, since it's a discussion about morality - so we should probably avoid the term "murder" in this thread.
Of course killing in war is murder, justified or not. Killing Hitler is a silly example, because killing him would not have ended the Holocaust, if that's what you're implying. The Batman example is also silly because, in real life, there is no such thing as a prisoner that no prison can hold. And "failure to prevent harm" is not a violation of the deontological constraint if the harm that befalls others is not a consequence of our own chosen means or chosen end, even though that is certainly open to criticism on other grounds.
I'm sad because no one seems to see fit to respond to what I think is actually a good point - killing someone in a war is wrong and killing the Joker would be wrong. Both killings may be justified or tolerated, but that doesn't make either killing moral; both killings are still wrong. Toleration and/or justification != moral.
Of course killing in war is murder, justified or not. Killing Hitler is a silly example, because killing him would not have ended the Holocaust, if that's what you're implying. The Batman example is also silly because, in real life, there is no such thing as a prisoner that no prison can hold. And "failure to prevent harm" is not a violation of the deontological constraint if the harm that befalls others is not a consequence of our own chosen means or chosen end, even though that is certainly open to criticism on other grounds.
I'm sad because no one seems to see fit to respond to what I think is actually a good point - killing someone in a war is wrong and killing the Joker would be wrong. Both killings may be justified or tolerated, but that doesn't make either killing moral; both killings are still wrong. Toleration and/or justification != moral.
Is it wrong to kill someone who's trying to kill you? Is it wrong to kill someone who's trying to kill innocents? I'd say no.
Of course killing in war is murder, justified or not. Killing Hitler is a silly example, because killing him would not have ended the Holocaust, if that's what you're implying. The Batman example is also silly because, in real life, there is no such thing as a prisoner that no prison can hold. And "failure to prevent harm" is not a violation of the deontological constraint if the harm that befalls others is not a consequence of our own chosen means or chosen end, even though that is certainly open to criticism on other grounds.
I'm sad because no one seems to see fit to respond to what I think is actually a good point - killing someone in a war is wrong and killing the Joker would be wrong. Both killings may be justified or tolerated, but that doesn't make either killing moral; both killings are still wrong. Toleration and/or justification != moral.
Is it wrong to kill someone who's trying to kill you? Is it wrong to kill someone who's trying to kill innocents? I'd say no.
I'd say that both killings were wrong but justified. Actually, in the real, practical world, both killers you posit would have the affirmative defenses of self defense or defense of others available to them, but they'd still have to show that they met the elements of the respective defenses at trial.
Moral right and wrong does not factor into pure consequentialism, only "desirable" and "undesirable" outcomes.
No, this is wrong. Consequentialism alone simply means that the consequences of our actions are the basis we should use to determine which actions to take. It does not make any claims about what kinds of consequences are the ones we ought to aim for, not without additional stipulations.
This is actually what I meant, I mixed up consequentialism with Bentham's version of utilitarianism. Exactly as you said, consequentialism does not make claims about what we ought or ought not to do, while deontology does, but ignores or gives little weight to consequence. That's what I was trying to convey in the first place, but I guess it wasn't clear.
And right, murder is the wrong word, it would have been more accurate to say "killing is killing," since one would argue if you side with Kant that killing is still morally wrong even if it is somehow justified.
And right, murder is the wrong word, it would have been more accurate to say "killing is killing," since one would argue if you side with Kant that killing is still morally wrong even if it is somehow justified.
Oh yeah, No argument from me either way about the morality of killing - I don't really know well enough to argue, to be honest - just that Murder and Homicide are different. Killing in war is not murder, granted, but it is still killing, and you're talking about the morality of it, not debating on what to call it.
Of course killing in war is murder, justified or not. Killing Hitler is a silly example, because killing him would not have ended the Holocaust, if that's what you're implying. The Batman example is also silly because, in real life, there is no such thing as a prisoner that no prison can hold. And "failure to prevent harm" is not a violation of the deontological constraint if the harm that befalls others is not a consequence of our own chosen means or chosen end, even though that is certainly open to criticism on other grounds.
I'm sad because no one seems to see fit to respond to what I think is actually a good point - killing someone in a war is wrong and killing the Joker would be wrong. Both killings may be justified or tolerated, but that doesn't make either killing moral; both killings are still wrong. Toleration and/or justification != moral.
You're mixing up simple values with actions. Very few people in the world will tell you that life, especially human life, is a bad thing. I think there's almost no one who really thinks that death is a good thing, either. So yes, ending someone's life is bad; it is never good to end someone's life. However, one needs to consider all of the consequences of an action, and whichever action results in the most good / least bad is the right one.
For example, it is bad when someone believes something that is probably not true. However, it is clearly not as bad as someone dying, so it is still the right thing to do to lie to the murderer at your door about your friend's location.
Also, someone dying is bad, but five people dying is worse. Consider the following formulation of the trolley problem (quoted from Wikipedia) "A trolley is running out of control down a track. In its path are five people who have been tied to the track by a mad philosopher. Fortunately, you could flip a switch, which will lead the trolley down a different track to safety. Unfortunately, there is a single person tied to that track. Should you flip the switch or do nothing?" It is the right thing to do to flip the switch - even though in doing so you kill one person. Not only that, but the person who does not flip the switch when they could have done so is guilty of four unnecessary deaths.
Also, I haven't seen anyone respond to my points about deontology - namely the poorly defined concept of "action". Are we happy to simply drop deontology? I don't see any worth in it at all.
Read some of Joshua Greene's work on studying moral judgement with techniques like fMRI here. I'm currently reading his paper "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul", and I'm quite impressed so far. To summarize, his hypothesis (and it seems well supported) is that, in essence, moral judgements that are typically deontological in nature are based on emotional gut reactions, and deontological ethics is merely rationalization of those gut reactions.
This might be going a bit too far, but the point is still an important one - we know that our intuitions can be and very often are wrong, so why should we trust them with regards to morality?
I'd say that both killings were wrong but justified. Actually, in the real, practical world, both killers you posit would have the affirmative defenses of self defense or defense of others available to them, but they'd still have to show that they met the elements of the respective defenses at trial.
Why is it still wrong even if it's justified? If an action is wrong then it isn't justified; it can't be both.
I'd say that both killings were wrong but justified. Actually, in the real, practical world, both killers you posit would have the affirmative defenses of self defense or defense of others available to them, but they'd still have to show that they met the elements of the respective defenses at trial.
Why is it still wrong even if it's justified? If an action is wrong then it isn't justified; it can't be both.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were widely thought to be justified at the time. Many people still believe they were justified. Does that mean they were morally righteous acts?
Who do you think gets to do the justifying? Suppose Busy Rodriguez hasn't studied for his Military History exam because he had to spend time nursing his ailing mother. Busy needs to make a good grade so he can keep his ROTC scholarship. Busy cheats on his exam. Of course, Busy thinks that he was justified in cheating. Do you think the Commandant of Cadets is likely to agree?
How about those Aztec sacrifices? Were they justified? The Aztecs certainly thought they were. Does that mean they were not wrong?
Thinking something is justified does not make it so, just as believing in God doesn't make it real. This is the issue I have with moral relativism. Sure, people in different cultures believe differently as to what is right and wrong, but this doesn't necessarily mean they have a fundamental, unresolvable disagreement on the matter. Quite a lot of disagreements on morality in modern society are the result of religious beliefs which are plainly false.
The ancient Greeks did not simply think slavery was a good thing in and of itself - they thought it was a necessity and they gave justifications for it, and those justifications were plainly false.
In general, moral relativism ignores the extent to which humans are misguided about the nature of reality, and it ignores the fact that people do not and cannot know the full extent of the workings of their own brain. Sure, I don't disagree that it's possible at a fundamental level for a human being to believe that happiness is a bad thing, or that life is a bad thing; in that sense morality is subjective. Nonetheless, how many such people have you met?
So, as for your questions, Joe: 1) Hiroshima probably wasn't justified, and Nagasaki almost certainly was not. 2) Rodriguez is probably making the right decision, and as long as he doesn't get caught, it doesn't matter what the Commandant of Cadets thinks about the matter. 3) The Aztecs were wrong.
Science also does not contradict itself. Biology doesn't say "All vertebrates must have backbones, unless they're special vertebrates." Biblical morality is plenty content to say, "Thou shalt not kill, unless the victims be of a different faith; then, thou shalt disembowel their pregnant, kill their men by the sword, and dash their babes upon the rocks."
Science contradicts itself all the time. It's most successful when finding contradictions. "All mammals bear live young," Wait what's this platypus thing? "Newton's laws explain planetary motion," wait why does mercury precess so much? Only by finding these contradictions does scientific knowledge progress.
Science contradicts itself all the time. It's most successful when finding contradictions. "All mammals bear live young," Wait what's this platypus thing? "Newton's laws explain planetary motion," wait why does mercury precess so much? Only by finding these contradictions does scientific knowledge progress.
Except science doesn't content itself with contradictions. Mammals are now just animals with hair, three middle ear bones, and mammary glands functional during the rearing of young offspring. Our job as scientists is to say "Okay, the previous hypotheses were incorrect. We must now rework them." Morality goes, "The previous hypotheses are correct in all cases, even when they are not."
Biblical morality is the equivalent of that most famous speech from 1984:
"How can I help seeing what is in front of my eyes? Two and two are four." "Sometimes, Winston. Sometimes they are five. Sometimes they are three. Sometimes they are all of them at once. You must try harder. It is not easy to become sane."
And that is why morality can never be a science.
Science can and should have a major role in the study and development of morality. At the very least, descriptive scientific morality is important - we should definitely study why and how people have a sense of morality, particularly through evolutionary and cognitive science. However, all you need for prescriptive scientific morality is to start with some set of core values - something along the lines of well-being of conscious creatures - and work out how to optimize human behaviours with respect to those values.
Granted, the is-ought problem is a valid issue, and so there is no scientific process for obtaining a set of core values. However, I think there are some rather obvious ones that are almost universal among human beings. How many people actually believe that death is preferable to life?
(If this discussion is going to continue, it should probably be in the morality thread)
Yes, science should be used to analyze morality. However, you can't say that biblical morality is scientific, as it cannot be reliably tested against its own framework.
You can apply the scientific method to anything. That doesn't make something a science.
Comments
If we're done we can go back to morality again ^_~
And you still didn't tell me what it means to "trust" your sense of reason. I've addressed that roughly 20 times in this thread. But I'll humor you. The fact that the perception happens means that the perception exists. Otherwise, there would be no perception. "I" could simply be the perception of thought. The point is that the subject is the one perceiving, and so must exist, since it's logically impossible to have a perception that isn't yours. Even then, how would you tell the difference? Perception begets awareness, and it will behave in the same way no matter the origin. So, all perceptions that you think are yours are in fact yours, and this necessitates your existence. Yeah, except that your continued demands for additional proof aren't actually valid.
The truth of your perceptions is completely irrelevant, and for reasons I've already stated, denying that you even have perceptions is a ridiculous exercise. They happen no matter what. I've already discussed doubting your existence in this thread. Knock it off. You haven't actually responded to it yet.
Consider what the tortoise said to Achilles. Even if it is a "ridiculous exercise", that doesn't make it false. On what basis must I accept that I perceive? That's a circular argument - you say that "I perceive because I perceive."
"God exists because he exists" is logically valid, but from the information available to me it does not appear to be sound. Why is it sound to say that "I perceive because I perceive"?
To quote Carneades, "Nothing can be known, not even this." (generally better than Socrates' "I know that I know nothing" for obvious reasons).
There is always the possibility of an extenuating circumstance. Murder is wrong, but would you have assassinated Hitler? At what point in the development of the fetus does abortion become murder? Is a self-defense killing murder? Do soldiers commit murder on the battlefield? Does that change if the war can be decided to be "just" or "unjust?" Can war be justified if capital punishment cannot? Do you think Batman should kill the Joker, or let him escape to murder more Boy Scouts at the amusement park? Can we call our failure to intervene in Darfur murder by inaction?
The categorical imperative is great in a vacuum. But it fails to make distinctions that utilitarianism better addresses.
For example, if I thrust my hand out in front of me, are not the presence of someone in front of me and the presence of a knife in my hand merely circumstances?
To me, Kant's Categorical Imperative just seems like trumped-up nonsense, as does the rest of deontology.
By introducing "desire" into the equation you have constructed a straw man.
Take the rule "murder is wrong". Why is it "murder" that is the action, and not simply, say, pulling a trigger on a gun? Isn't pulling the trigger the real "action", while someone dying is simply a consequence? Do we then say that pulling a trigger on a gun is wrong, even if the gun isn't pointed at a person? Otherwise, why not consider that absolutely everything that happens as a result of the action to be part of that action?
To accept all consequences as part of the action in deontology is precisely the same as consequentialism. On the other hand, if we don't go that far, then why is murder the action and not trigger-pulling?
And right, murder is the wrong word, it would have been more accurate to say "killing is killing," since one would argue if you side with Kant that killing is still morally wrong even if it is somehow justified.
Very few people in the world will tell you that life, especially human life, is a bad thing. I think there's almost no one who really thinks that death is a good thing, either.
So yes, ending someone's life is bad; it is never good to end someone's life.
However, one needs to consider all of the consequences of an action, and whichever action results in the most good / least bad is the right one.
For example, it is bad when someone believes something that is probably not true. However, it is clearly not as bad as someone dying, so it is still the right thing to do to lie to the murderer at your door about your friend's location.
Also, someone dying is bad, but five people dying is worse. Consider the following formulation of the trolley problem (quoted from Wikipedia)
"A trolley is running out of control down a track. In its path are five people who have been tied to the track by a mad philosopher. Fortunately, you could flip a switch, which will lead the trolley down a different track to safety. Unfortunately, there is a single person tied to that track. Should you flip the switch or do nothing?"
It is the right thing to do to flip the switch - even though in doing so you kill one person. Not only that, but the person who does not flip the switch when they could have done so is guilty of four unnecessary deaths.
Also, I haven't seen anyone respond to my points about deontology - namely the poorly defined concept of "action". Are we happy to simply drop deontology? I don't see any worth in it at all.
I'm currently reading his paper "The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul", and I'm quite impressed so far. To summarize, his hypothesis (and it seems well supported) is that, in essence, moral judgements that are typically deontological in nature are based on emotional gut reactions, and deontological ethics is merely rationalization of those gut reactions.
This might be going a bit too far, but the point is still an important one - we know that our intuitions can be and very often are wrong, so why should we trust them with regards to morality?
Who do you think gets to do the justifying? Suppose Busy Rodriguez hasn't studied for his Military History exam because he had to spend time nursing his ailing mother. Busy needs to make a good grade so he can keep his ROTC scholarship. Busy cheats on his exam. Of course, Busy thinks that he was justified in cheating. Do you think the Commandant of Cadets is likely to agree?
How about those Aztec sacrifices? Were they justified? The Aztecs certainly thought they were. Does that mean they were not wrong?
This is the issue I have with moral relativism. Sure, people in different cultures believe differently as to what is right and wrong, but this doesn't necessarily mean they have a fundamental, unresolvable disagreement on the matter. Quite a lot of disagreements on morality in modern society are the result of religious beliefs which are plainly false.
The ancient Greeks did not simply think slavery was a good thing in and of itself - they thought it was a necessity and they gave justifications for it, and those justifications were plainly false.
In general, moral relativism ignores the extent to which humans are misguided about the nature of reality, and it ignores the fact that people do not and cannot know the full extent of the workings of their own brain. Sure, I don't disagree that it's possible at a fundamental level for a human being to believe that happiness is a bad thing, or that life is a bad thing; in that sense morality is subjective. Nonetheless, how many such people have you met?
1) Hiroshima probably wasn't justified, and Nagasaki almost certainly was not.
2) Rodriguez is probably making the right decision, and as long as he doesn't get caught, it doesn't matter what the Commandant of Cadets thinks about the matter.
3) The Aztecs were wrong.
You can apply the scientific method to anything. That doesn't make something a science.